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In his article "Animal Rights" 
(CJP 7 [1977], pp. 161-178), Jan 
Narveson presents an alternative 
moral theory to what he calls the 
"Singer-Regan position." This theory ­
rational egoism - would exclude 
non-human animals from moral considera­
tion and deny them all rights. Regan 
replied to this argument in his 
article "Narveson on Egoism and the 
Rights of Animals" (CJP 7 [1977], pp. 
179-186). Now Dale Jamieson has 
entered the debate with his "Rational 
Egoism and Animal Rights," a critique 
both of Narveson's position and of 
Regan's rebuttal. 
Narveson's argument, briefly, is 
as follows: rights are based solely 
on agreements between rational egoists 
which foster the mutual attainment of 
self-interested ends. I acknowledge 
someone else's self-interested claim 
as a right so that he will acknowledge 
mine in turn. Non-human animals can 
neither assert self-interested claims 
as rights nor force human beings to 
acknowledge them through the coercive 
power to infringe on their correspond­
ing rights. Hence non-human animals 
have no rights. We are therefore 
morally entitled to abuse them in any 
way we choose, so long as we do not 
violate our own self-interest. 
Jamieson points out that this 
theory also denies rights to mental 
defectives and to young children. 
How does Narveson ensure that these 
"rightless" humans will not be abused? 
He argues that the very self-interest 
which is the basis of rights dictates 
that we treat these humans as though 
they had rights. A rational egoist 
will treat children equally because 
the self-interests of parents includes 
the self-interest of their children 
and because he has nothing to gain 
from abusing other people's children. 
He will treat morons equally lest he 
not be treated equally were he to 
become a moron. To this "rational" 
argument Narveson appends two 
"non-rational" bases for equal 
treatment of morons. The first is 
that a moron's rational relatives may 
have a "sentimental interest" in his 
being treated equally. The other 
factor is "sentiment-generalization," 
the human tendency to extend sympathy 
to members of one's own race, species, 
etc. 
In their replies to Narveson, 
both Regan and Jamieson try to show 
that considerations of self-interest 
will not guarantee that morons and 
children will be treated equally. 
Regan limits himself to the case of 
idiots, arguing that it is unnecessary, 
from the perspective of rational 
egoism, to accord equal treatment to 
all idiots in order to guarantee 
protection for oneself in the event 
that one became an idiot. All that 
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would be necessary would be to guaran­
tee continued equal treatment of all 
those who became idiots. This leaves 
the door open for the abuse of congen­
ital idiots since such abuse would in 
no way violate the rational egoists' 
self-interests. Nor would "sentimental 
interest" guarantee equal treatment of 
congenital idiots since many of them 
are not the object of such interest. 
Jamieson criticizes Regan's 
second point on the grounds that a 
rational egoist could respond that the 
"epistemological problem" involved in 
determining who is the object of 
sentimental interest is so severe that 
all idiots should be included in the 
"ambit of morality." This seems to me 
a rather quibbling, if not patently 
false objection to Regan's argument. 
Nor are Jamieson's own arguments 
any stronger. He asserts that the 
concept of egoistic self-interest is 
fluid and that we consequently might 
come to the view that idiots are 
"obscene moral failures" who should 
be exterminated. Such an alteration 
in rational egoists' concepts of their 
own self-interest would result in 
the abuse of idiots being mandated 
by self-interest. 
Jamieson also hypothesizes that 
a population explosion could result 
in a view of human fetuses as a 
threat to survival and as therefore 
contrary to one's self-interests. 
Were this to happen we might resort 
to cannibalism. Anything, of course, 
is possible, but these "fables," as 
Jamieson calls them, bear more 
resemblance to the idle and rather 
paranoid speculations which support 
domino theories in politics than to 
a cogent retort to rational egoism. 
Jamieson's argument, however, 
suffers from more serious defects 
than implausibility. In the first 
place, it is not even relevant except 
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to the extent that Narveson is incon­
sistent in his reasoning, i.e., is 
not a pure rational egoist. A con­
sistent rational egoist has no 
reason to share Jamieson's concern 
for "marginal cases. i, Mistreatment 
of children and morons can be of no 
moral concern to a consistent rational 
egoist unless it results in the 
reduction of his own self-interest. 
Insofar as Narveson is inconsist­
ently concerned about children and 
idiots, this is an indication of his 
implicit acceptance of a moral 
premise which runs against the doctrine 
of rational egoism. This is the 
chief flaw in his argument which 
should be examined, but Jamieson 
totally ignores it. 
Moreover, his approach is 
defective in principle, for it leaves 
open the possibility of justifying 
the continued abuse of non-human 
animals. By accepting the issue on 
Narveson's own terms, Jamieson grants 
him the opportunity to try to produce 
more convincing arguments from self­
interest for the equal treatment of 
children and idiots. Were he success­
ful in doing this, then the continued 
abuse of animals would be justified 
on the principles of rational egoism. 
Jamieson's argument is thus 
incorrigibly speciesist: he argues, 
in effect, that it is wrong to abuse 
animals because it may lead to the 
abuse of human beings. Thus when he 
concludes his article by saying that 
"because it is a bad moral theory, 
rational egoism fails to provide a 
solid basis for a principled indiffer­
ence to the suffering of animals," he 
is certainly correct, but not at all 
in the way he imagines. Rational 
egoism is a "bad moral theory," not 
because the equal treatment of 
children and idiots cannot be 
guaranteed by considerations of 
egoistic self-interest, but because 
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the exclusion of non-human animals 
(as well as children and idiots) from 
ethical consideration is a moral out­-
rage which is totally unjustified if 
one accepts what I take to be a self­-
evident moral principle: viz. that 
pain is an evil, the deliberate, 
unnecessary infliction of which is 
always morally wrong. 
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